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1. Introduction 
What do we mean by a "philosophy of culture"? One inter-
pretation is a philosophy of those societies that have formed a 
recognized culture. Just as one can do textual histor y only of 
societies with the ability to write, one could argue that the phi-
losophy of culture is properly speaking done only with respect 
to societies with a culture that meets certain criteria. That is 
very far from how Ernst Cassirer conceived of the philosophy 
of culture 1. Ernst Wolfgang Orth observes, "[f]or him [Cassir-
er], the 'philosophy of symbolic forms' is to be considered as 
the 'prolegomena to a future philosophy of culture' (1938). The 
'[Kantian] critique of reason' - for Cassirer, the ultimate meta-
physics, even as critique - is transformed inevitably with Cassir-
er into a 'critique of culture"' (Orth 2013, 556-557). 
Cassirer rejected a picture according to which the "forms" 
of human culture and science can be reduced to the relation 
between those forms and the external world, a world, as Orth 
puts it, "'beyond' or 'behind' the world of appearances". What 
Cassirer focuses on, instead, is "the internal variety, abundance, 
and diversity of the 'phenomena themselves' , insofar as they 
manifest themselves in the process of symbolic formation of the 
human world" (Orth 2013, 556-557). The aim of the philoso-
phy of symbolic forms is not to find a one-to -one fit between 
the forms and the external world. Instead , symbolic forms 
1 For Cassirer on culture see LUFT 2015, ORTH 2011, 201.3, !K ONEN 2011, M A-
THE RNE 2015. 
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themselves are the phenomena to be analyzed: their structure 
and development, and the relations between them, illuminate 
the "symbolic formation of the human world" - a world that 
includes social and cultural interactions and phenomena. 
The subject of this paper is Cassirer's analysis of the logic of 
the cultural sciences2. One might ask what could possibly uni-
fy the cultural sciences in Cassirer's view, since he describes 
the relevant phenomena as comprising any "effort to compre-
hend the world". The unification comes, not from reference to 
what lies beyond the appearances, but to the structure of the 
efforts to comprehend the world, including the cultural and so-
cial worlds we inhabit 3. The central problem for Wt'ssenscha/t 
in general that Cassirer identifies, the problem of "objectiviza -
tion", has two facets. The first is recognizing objects as such. 
The second is showing that our knowledge of those objects is, 
in fact, "objective", in a sense that Cassirer analyzes differently 
in different stages of his career. 
Friedman (2000) has argued that Cassirer's view entails that 
the Geisteswissenscha/ten share in the 'universal validity' of 
the Naturwissenscha/ten, but that Cassirer did not show how 
this was to be achieved, or how, if the types of validity were 
different, they were to be related to each other. Krois (2010) 
responds that Cassirer's notion of "symbolic pregnance" is a 
significant clue to his view of validity in the cultural sciences. 
"Symbolic pregnance" is one aspect of Cassirer's account of the 
symbol, of linguistic form, and of the structures analyzed in the 
cultural and life sciences. To understand these, it is also neces-
sary to explain Cassirer's relationship to the other practitioners 
of Wissenschaft whose work he followed. Krois had empha-
sized in earlier work the relevance of Gestal t psychology and 
especially of Cassirer's cousin and friend Kurt Goldstein (Krois 
1992). In recent work, Fred erik Stjernfelt has emphasized Cas-
sirer's relationship to the biologist Jakob van Uexkiill (Stjem -
felt 2011); and I have emphasized the influence of the founders 
2 The most direct , obvious translation of Cassirer 's Logik der Kulturwissenscha/ten. 
3 See ORTH 2011 for discussion of the latter point. 
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of Volkerpsychologie, Moritz Lazarus and especially Heymann 
Steinthal (Patton 2004, 2014-2015). 
I will discuss two aspects of the role of the symbolic, of logic, 
and of language in Ernst Cassirer's thought. First, that phenom-
ena including linguistic expression and psychological categori-
zation are processes that can be analyzed using a "logic", where 
"logic" is here used in a sense Cassirer borrowed from late 
nineteenth century Erkenntnistheorie and from Heymann Stein-
thal's linguistics. The logical analysis of symbols and culture 
will be contrasted with Kantian and neo-Kantian approaches. 
Second, given this picture of logic, the development of the "ex-
pressive function" of language, and even of the representational 
function, can be analyzed as autonomous from universal a prio-
ri logical structures, but still analyzable in terms of the applied 
logic of Erkenntnistheorie. Cassirer defends a common under-
standing of the cultural sciences via logic, but not a priori logic. 
2. Logic and Nature in the Sciences 
Ernst Cassirer is well known as the scion of the Mar-
burg school of neo-Kantianism, but his philosophy of cul-
ture goes well beyond earlier neo-Kantian accounts - Dis-
cenna (2014) even reads him within the rhetorical tradition. 
The early move away from doctrinal neo-Kantianism in Cas-
sirer was his concern with language: "The first step in [Cas-
sirer's] 'Loslosung' [departure ] from Neo-Kantianism oc-
curred when, in the Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 
[ . .. ] [i]nstead of asking about how 'knowledge' was possi-
ble, Cassirer asked about the conditions of the possibility of 
our ways of 'understanding' the world and of understand-
ing one another in language" {Krois 1992, 439; see also Kro-
is 2011, 10-12). Cassirer's incorporation of language and of 
cultural phenomena goes well beyond Cohen's. In Cassirer's 
words, " [Cohen] saw the essential nature of the transcen-
dental method therein that this method always began with a 
factum, but then he narrowed down this general definition 
- begin with a factum in order to ask about the possibility of 
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this factum - so that again and again the thing most worth ask-
ing about was mathematical science. Kant did not limit things 
in this way. I ask about the possibility of the factum of lan-
guage. How is it, how is it conceivable, that we are able to un-
derstand one another from Dasein to Dasein in this medium?" 4. 
Samantha Matherne locates Cassirer's analysis of "objec-
tive understanding" in his revision to Kantian transcendental 
logic. Kant 's conception focused on the transcendental condi-
tions of knowledge, involving the rules for employing a priori 
concepts to objects of a possible experience. Cassirer extends 
the notion of "experience" to encompass "cultural experience 
more broadly, as it unfolds in myth, religion, art, and language 
[ .. . ] When approached from the latter perspective, Cassirer's 
transcendental logic ceases to be the logic of objective cogni-
tion and becomes, instead, the logic of objectt've understanding" 
(Matherne 2018, 146). Another way of putting this is to say that 
Cassirer focused his analysis of "experience" on a set of specific 
cultural forms of experience that Kant never considered in par-
ticular. Kant never provided an analysis of how we experience 
myth or language, for instance. But Kant did think that we have 
experience of artworks and other cultural phenomena, which 
he analyzes in detail in the third Critique. Nonetheless, Kant 
did not think cultural experience was the basis of objective 
knowledge. Cassirer formulates a logic of objective understand -
ing to encompass the type of understanding that arises from 
forms of cultural experience. This may not be "understanding" 
in Kant's sense, because that would involve knowledge. Rather, 
Cassirer's 'objective understanding' seems to have a more collo-
quial meaning: how we are able to understand each other. 
Cassirer wishes to preserve the autonomy of the cultural 
world from explanations in terms of materialist or physicalist 
reduction, and even from a priori or metaphysical explanations 
in terms of logic. Kinzel (2018) has argued, for instance, that 
Dilthe y sought a foundation for the human sciences in psychol-
ogy. In contrast, Cassirer did not attempt to find a single foun-
4 Krois refers the reader to pp. 246 -268 of Cassirer's remarks in DD. 
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dation or a priori method for the cultural sciences5. This is how 
the problem of the unity of the cultural sciences arises for Cas-
sirer. Still, in The Logic of the Cultural Sciences, he does argue 
that the logic of the title does exist. How is that possible? 
In my view, what Cassirer means by "logic" often is mis-
understood. And despite the fact that Cassirer departed from 
the neo-Kantian approaches in some ways, by the "logic" of 
cultural sciences Cassirer means a type of logic that is found 
in classical Erkenntnistheorie, in writers including Heymann 
Steinthal, Heinrich Maier, and Friedrich Albert Lange. At the 
end of the nineteenth century, a Festschrift was organized for 
Christoph Sigwart. Maier took the opportunity to take stock of 
the field, noting that "it has become common in modern logic 
to conceive of the foundations of logical investigation with re-
spect to the doctrine of method [Methodenlehre]" . Maier ob-
serves a profound "reform of logic" over the last few decades 
of the nineteenth century: "Its guiding idea is to seek out logical 
thought in scientific knowledge [Erkennen], in scientific meth-
ods. Thus, logic becomes a doctrine of the structures and laws 
of scientific thought". Late nineteenth century logicians con-
verged, according to Maier, on the view that "the primary ob-
ject of logic is that type of thought that finds expression in acts 
of judgment" 6. 
The conception of logic in this passage, which appears in a 
paper called Logik und Erkenntnistheorie (1900), is remark-
ably pluralist: any "type of thought that finds expression in 
acts of judgment". Still, it excludes from view all non-discur-
sive thought, thought that does not end in or at least is not 
intended to end in conceptual judgment. It thus distinguishes 
sharply between thought that eventuates in judgment, and de-
I do not insist on a rigid distinction in this paper between the Kulturwissen-
scha/ten and the Geisteswissenscha/ten. However, this difference between Dilthey and 
Cassirer is one way to make it. While Cassi.rec analyzed the facts of culture and tried to 
find the structures immanent in them , if KlNZEL (2018) is correc t , Dilthey tried to find 
a psychological foundation for the Geisteswissenscha/ten. 
6 MALER 1900, 219-221, my translation. For more on post-Kantian logic, see 
LAPOINTE 2018. 
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scriptions of thought in general : "This excludes from logical in-
terest a considerable number of the functions that one usually 
includes in the description of thought . Involuntary appearances 
and spontaneous visitations of perceptions or representations, 
the uncontrolled play of the course of an idea and voluntary 
reproduction, the intentional dissolution of series of thoughts 
for some reason, intuition that withdraws from discursive con -
nections [. .. ] - all this belongs in the pre -logical sphere of 
thought" 7. 
Maier's description of the "reform of logic" at the end of 
the nineteenth century describes Cassirer's break with Kantian 
logic in his philosophy of culture rather well. Cassirer, too, ex-
cludes non -discursive thought from "logic", even his very cath -
olic "logic" of the cultural sciences . This is the realm of the 
"expressive function" in the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: lan -
guage can have an expressive function, but that does not mean 
it is a part of or governed by logic. Cassirer means for myth, 
language, the expressive function, and the basic forms of sym-
bolization and expression to be included as phenomena to be 
analyzed by the cultural sciences, and he refers to them as Ba-
sisphiinomene or "basis phenomena" (Krois 1992). Why, then, 
does he exclude them from the logic of those sciences? 
It is very plausible that Cassirer is following his mentor 
Chajim (Heymann) Steinthal 8. Steinthal was one of the found-
ers of Volkerpsychologie, "ethnopsychology", along with Mo-
ses (Moritz) Lazarus 9• Lazarus and Steinthal analyzed, not the 
H egelian Geist, but the Volksgeist. The Volksgeist is made 
manifest in artefacts of culture, which are analyzed into the 
expressive and representational structures they contain 10. In 
Steinthal's 1871 Outline of the Science of Language (hereafter 
Outline), Steinthal announces a "science" of language, in which 
7 MAIER 1900, 219-221, my translation. See chapter 1 in PATTON 2004. 
8 See PATTON 2014-2015. 
9 The school of Volkerpsychologie influenced Hermann Cohen, Wilhelm Dilthey, 
and Georg Simme l, as well as Cassirer. See KUSCH 2019, EDGAR 2020 , REINERS 2020, 
SKJDELSKY 200.3. 
10 See the introductions to LAZARUS and STEINTHAL 1860 and 1862. 
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he analyzes language as a natural phenomenon: thought, cate-
gories, concepts, and expression are developed, not acquired or 
inborn, and they contribute to the construction of language as a 
formal structure. 
Steinthal's fundamental position in the Outline is that lan-
guage is an organic, natural phenomenon that escapes the 
boundaries of a priori laws of thought. Human language devel-
ops on its own, unconstrained by prior decisions about concep-
tual categories or means of expression: "language, independent-
ly of logic, establishes its forms in complete autonomy" (Stein-
thal 1871, 62). Steinthal's Outline probably is the source of Cas-
sirer's account of the expressive function, as Steinthal argues 
that language has an expressive form that is independent of its 
logical or representational content 11. 
But a very significant distinction must be kep t in mind here. 
Just because language develops independently of logic, that 
does not mean that language cannot be explained or understood 
using logic, especially using the methodological logic of Erken-
ntnt'stheorie described above by Maier, with which Steinthal, 
like Cassirer, was intimately familiar. As Steinthal remarks, that 
applied logic was developed to capture the inferential forms 
found in nature. 
Physics, chemistry, mathematics, and so on are not logical, nature 
is not logical, that is, no logical facts, categories, and laws are given in 
them; but they certainly are very logical, because their developments 
are carried out according to the laws of logic [ ... ] The object of the 
special sciences is specific to them , not only their matter [Stoff], but 
also the general relationships that appear in them , which one even 
calls categories, like the know ledge of chemical substances [Stolfe] 
and the relationships according to which they are connected to each 
other, like sphere, circumference, diameter 12. 
Again, Steinthal's "logic" in this passage is the methodolog-
ical, applied logic of the later tradition of Erkenntnistheorie 
that Meier summarizes, above. That logic is a kind of structur -
11 PATTON 2014-2015, 108-109 and passim. 
12 STEINTHAL 1871, 69, my translation. 
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al analysis of structures and forms that are taken to have devel-
oped independently of logic itself: "In sofar as our capacity for 
rational thought stretches to these objects and their relation-
ships, then here it proceeds in a way in which the forms of log-
ic are visible; for logic is the analysis of thought , that is, of the 
capacity of thought, in abstraction from the objects to which it 
is applied" 13. Steinthal goes beyond this familiar picture , that 
logic consists of the abstract analysis of rules of thought, with 
the view that logic traces the process of production of objects in 
nature: "Even more: nature produces objects , and carries this 
out through media and methods that the special sciences have 
as their particular object to represent. Insofar as we represent 
this way of proceeding in thought and represent the real path of 
the development of the thing by a subjective , conceptual copy, 
we perceive in thought not bare logical relationships, but [logi-
cal relationships ] in actual nature itself that live within it, logical 
laws that it follows faithfully" 14 . Here , Steinthal observes that 
if logic is to trace the production of objects and phenomena in 
nature , then logic does not merely represent our thought about 
categories and concepts , but also about the "real path of the de-
velopment of the thing". 
Steinthal argues that this analysis applies to the development 
of language as well. We can trace , not just the categories that 
evolve in language, but also the path of development of linguis-
tic relationships: 
Just as with nature and the natural sciences , language and linguis-
tics are also logical and not logical : namely, their object with its rela-
tionships is specific to them; but insofar as one thinks this object and 
these relationships , the logician perceives both that the linguistic re-
searcher acts according to logical laws , and that logical considerations 
and laws have unconsciously governed the process of language , in 
forming its elements and combining them according to their specif-
ic laws. These logical laws, which language and linguistic researchers , 
chemists and ph ysicists and nature follow, are the common logical 
lJ STElNTHAL 1871, 69, my trans lation . 
14 STEINTHAL 1871, 69-70, my tra nslat ion. 
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laws, whose demonstration the researcher into language and nature 
presupposes, that he does not investigate, that are not his particular 
object (Steinthal 1871, 70). 
This is exactly the position that can be found in Cassirer's 
work on the formal structures discovered in language and in 
culture more generally 15. In fact, Steinthal's emphasis on find-
ing logical 'real' 'relationships' as opposed to abstract categories 
is an earlier anticipation of Cassirer's critique of Aristotelian 
emphasis on 'thing -concepts ' over 'function -concepts' in Chap-
ter 1 of Substance and Function. Accordingly, we find a similar 
tension here in Steinthal that has been found already in Cassirer 
by numerous commentators. Steinthal asserts that language de-
velops independently of logic, but he also argues that "logical 
considerations and laws have unconsciously governed the pro-
cess of language, in forming its elements and combining them 
according to their specific laws" (Steinthal 1871, 70) . 
Cassirer, similarly, argues that the expressive function of lan-
guage is not logical or law-governed, but also that language and 
even experience are aimed at communication and objectiviza-
tion, both of which require logic. And, just as Steinthal does, 
Cassirer argues that the "objects" of cultural research are al-
ready found within the products of culture, even though they 
have not been consciously put there: even myth has an objectiv -
izing tendency. This tension can be found in the second study 
of The Logic of the Cultural Sciences, The Perception of Things 
and the Perception of Expression, where "Cassirer essentially re-
hearses the content of his theory of symbolic pregnance [sym-
bol£sche Pregnanz], though in different language and withou t 
himself remarking upon it. Perception has 'in its simple phe-
nomenal state [ ... ] to some extent, a double face'. It divides in-
to the 'perception of things' [Dingwahrnehmung ] and the 'per -
ception of expression' [Ausdruckswahrnehmung ]. Both are in 
fact culturally generated" 16. 
Friedman's critical point about Cassirer and the Geisteswis-
15 See PSF I , chapter 1. 
16 Ci ted in KROIS 2011, 126. 
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senscha/ten can thus be made more pointed. First, it is import-
ant to clarify that, in most of his work, Cassirer is concerned 
with what he calls the Kulturw£ssenscha/ten, a point to which I 
will return in the final section. These need not be governed by a 
Hegelian logic of the unfolding of Geist, and need not be given 
an a priori foundation. Second, of course, this makes Friedman's 
point more, not less, pressing . How, if culture develops inde-
pendently from logic, is it to be given a unified logical method 
or analysis? How can there be one human culture? Cassirer does 
argue that there is one human culture, but how can he? 
3. One Common Objective H uman World: 
Living Forms and Perception 
The logic of late Erkenntnistheorie is not taken to be a logic 
that governs the development of the natural processes or phe-
nomena under analysis, but rather one that describes the formal 
and structural aspects of that development and of the resulting 
phenomena. As Cassirer himself remarked, this sort of analysis 
made cultural artefacts similar to the biological structures stud-
ied by Cuvier and von Uexkiill (see Stjernfelt 2011). It is crucia l 
for Cassirer that he keep the functional analysis of biological 
organisms and of mental processes distinct from the structura l 
description of those organisms and processes. 
Cassirer's complex response to the debates over vitalism and 
free will involved invoking a Kantian purposiveness without a 
purpose, arguing that one can build legitimate functional mod-
els of organisms and of consciousness without in any way as-
serting that those models are reducible to - or even accurate 
descriptions of - the organisms and minds themselves. Accord-
ing to Uexkiill, living 'form' cannot be divorced from the re-
lationships it encodes, and cannot be accounted for by giving 
descriptions of the 'force and matter' that embodies those rela-
tions: "Uexkiill argues that biological form has a status parallel 
to that of geometry, i.e . irreducibly spatial relations which may 
never be reduced to their material basis. Geometrical form is 
thus a construct wrongly rejected by Darwinism and material -
Symbolic Forms and the Logic of the Cultural Sciences 271 
ism, for any true biological description must necessarily resort 
not only to force and matter, but also to form. Thus, it is only 
form, and the related concept of 'typical development,' which 
allows biology to perform deductions" (Stjernfelt 2011, 178). 
Uexkiill's program for the life sciences concentrates on research 
into structure and form as well as force and matter: "Uexkiill's 
research program is seen as one of Struktur/orschung, and its 
implicit dismissal of a Drieschian notion of entelechy opens the 
gates for a completely new knowledge interest in Uexkiill: that 
of form as an autonomous problem. Purpose is here taken, not 
as a separate force, but as Zweckmiissigkeit, purposiveness, ly-
ing in the very structural composition of biological entities, in 
their Planmiissigkeit, their plan-like structure" (Stjernfelt 2011, 
178). The analysis of structures, of functions that are based on 
forms, is what allows for explanation and deduction in biology. 
This structural analysis, however, does not have to be causal. As 
Cassirer later observes, Uexkiill "could dismiss the causal prob -
lem of physics and chemistry if only it were recognized that 
causality is not the whole of science and that there is an inde-
pendent problem of form, for which biology has to develop its 
own concepts and methods of thought. Once this was granted, 
the conflict between mechanism and vitalism was over so far as 
Uexkiill was concerned. He was interested in the fact that the re 
is a nonmaterial ordering, a rule of the living process that gives 
to organic matter whatever arrangement it may have" (EPW 1, 
235 [202]). Uexkiill's approach focuses on the structural order-
ing of processes. 
While Stjernfelt goes on to note Cassirer's criticisms of Uex-
kiill, it is intriguing to consider the similarities between Uex-
kiill's structural an.alysis of biological organisms and Steinthal's 
structural analysis of natural language. In Steinthal's Outline 
of the Science of Language, the "expressive form" of language 
plays the role of Uexkiill's living form; the applied logic of 
Erkenntnistheorie plays the role of Uexkiill's "nonmaterial or-
dering"; and a priori, law-governed logic plays the role of natu-
ral-scientific, mechanistic, causal explanations in the life scienc-
es. The idea of "form as an autonomous problem" is implicit in 
272 The Method of Culture 
Steinthal's analysis of language as well. Steinthal's "expressive 
form" of language is independent of a priori logic just as Uex-
killl's biological form is independent of law-governed, causal 
explanation. 
The crucial point here is that the applied logic of late Erken-
ntnistheorie - of Maier, Steinthal, and (I argue) Cassirer - is not 
a universal, absolute, deterministic logic. It is neither Hegel's 
absolute spirit nor even Kant's transcendental logic that asserts 
a priori categories of thought as necessary conditions for objec -
tive knowledge. The basis for the unity of the cultural sciences 
- even of the unity of explanations in the life sciences - for Cas-
sirer must come from basic, observable phenomena. In biology, 
we are able to appeal to specific structures that make possible 
an explanation in terms of Planmafligkeit: being constructed 
as zf according to a plan. In the case of language, our ability to 
communicate and to explain comes from the fact that we are 
able to construct languages and expressions that are the basis 
of mutual understanding (an ability that rests on even more ba-
sic phenomena revealed in perception, which may rest on even 
more basic neurological and biological capacities, and so on). In 
the case of language, the explanation provided for the unity of 
language as a cultural phenomenon is not a hypothetical expla-
nation. Instead, it is an explanation in terms of what to Cassirer 
is an indisputable fact, the fact that humans are able to develop 
languages that other humans, with sufficient effort, are able to 
understand. Thus, Cassirer appeals to "one common objective 
human world in which, although the differences of individuals 
are in no way cancelled, a bridge is built from individual to in-
dividual". Here, we find the basis for what Matherne, above, re-
f erred to as the notion of "objective understanding" in Cassirer. 
Cassirer notes that he finds this basis 
again and again in the primal phenomenon of language. Everyone 
speaks his own language, and yet we understand each other through 
the medium of language. There is something such as the language, 
something such as a unity over and above the endlessly different ways 
of speaking. Therein lies the decisive point for me. And therefore, I 
start from the objectivity of the symbolic Form because here the "in-
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conceivable is achieved". That is what I should like to call the world 
of objective spirit. There is no other way from one existence [Dasein] 
to another existenc e [Dasein] than through this world of Form. If it 
did not exist, then I would not know how such a thing as common 
understanding could be 17. 
This statement by Cassirer, made during the Davos dispu-
tation with Heidegger, is perhaps one of those passages that 
Friedman was considering when he said Cassirer did not pro -
vide a logic of the cultural sciences 18. If we think of "logic" as 
a set of unifying a priori principles that govern, for instance, the 
construction of language, then it seems that that logic should 
be the source of the unification of language in the above pas-
sage. But it should be clear by now that this is not the type of 
logic Cassirer means. Instead, Cassirer means that the human 
ability to construct logically analyzable linguistic structures re-
sults in "endlessly different" structures - but that, nonetheless, 
we are able to build bridges between any two such structures. 
That fact is not guaranteed by a prlorl logic, but by the "primal 
phenomenon" of linguistic expression, which is suited to the 
purpose of communication between individuals. The ability to 
represent content, and to communicate that content, is located 
neither in the subject nor in the object, but in the relation be-
tween the two 19. 
It may be true that we all have access to a "primal" or basic 
level of phenomenal experience or expressive form. But that lev-
el is distinguished, in Cassirer, from the representative function 
of language and of structures of knowledge in general. What, 
then, is to guarantee that the basic phenomenal content of any 
person's experience or the basic form of any person's linguistic 
expression can be communicated to any other person? Even if 
that communication is via representational structures, one can-
not refer to the representational structures themselves in giving 
17 DD 201-202, cited in DISCENNA 2014, 255. 
18 There is a relevant discussion of th is facet of the Philosophy o/ Symbolic Forms 
in § 4 of FRIEDMAN 2011. 
19 For detailed analysis of the Marburg notion of 'experience' see RICHARDSON 2003. 
274 The Method of Culture 
an answer. Then one ends up deep in the thicket of inter -trans-
lation between representational and inferential structures, and 
Cassirer explicitly does not intend to appeal to structural in-
ter-translation as a source of the unity of the "human world", 
but to a common basic level of perception and expression . 
To do justice to Cassirer's complex solution to the prob-
lem, one would need to appeal - at least - to two sources of 
the unity of cultural consciousness: a holistic unity and a basic 
unity. Holistic unity stems from Cassirer's account of organisms 
in biology, including the notion of form in living organisms as 
found in Goethe, Cuvier, and Uexkilll (Krois 1992; Stjemfelt 
2011). The holistic unity is that which results from hypothetical 
Planmii./!,igkeit, or being structured as z/ according to a plan. An 
analysis of the structure of a whole, even a hypothetical whole, 
shows how the structure can be regarded as a plan or blueprint 
for a unified construction. Moreover, each part of the struc-
ture can be regarded as making the holistic unity possible. All 
this can be done without arguing that there is an a priori plan 
according to which the whole was constructed. The cultural 
world can be considered as a structural or formal whole with -
out being unified under a priori laws or principles. 
Basic unity, for Cassirer, is founded on the character of 
phenomenal experience, and especially on two factors : (1) Ba-
sis phenomena [Basisphiinomene] (see, e.g., Krois 2011), and 
(2) The interaction between symbolic ideation (symbolic con -
sciousness) and sensory consciousness 20 . Clues to how Cas-
sirer saw these two elements interacting can be found in Cas-
sirer's intellectual relationship to his cousin Kurt Goldstein. 
With his collaborator, the Gestalt psychologist Adhemar Gelb, 
Goldstein performed experiments that, according to Cassirer, 
demonstrate the relationship between "symbolic conscious-
ness" and "sensory consciousness" 21 . In a letter to Goldstein , 
20 See , e.g., NCW' 25 [CASSIRER 1999, 666]. 
21 NCW 25 [CASSIRER 1999, 661]. The influence of Goldstein on Cassirer is very well 
known and has been analyzed in detail (e.g., GURWJTSCH 1949, KROIS 1992). In a 2020 
paper , Mazviita Chirimuuta traces the mutual influence between Goldstein 's work in bio-
logy and living forms and Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (CHIRIMUUTA 2020). 
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Cassirer remarks that the "genuinely symbolic (i.e., the use of 
something sensible as a pure sign, as the material carrier of 
meaning) is always a relatively late achievement of develop-
ment. This achievement must first pass through various stag -
es which are closer to the prior, immediately -sensory stages of 
conduct" 22. Here we find a particularly clear statement of the 
idea of symbolic pregnance. Perceptual experience, for Cassir-
er, always involves an interaction between the symbolic and the 
sensible. But the symbolic element of consciousness takes time 
and practice to achieve (PSF I). In certain types of perceptual 
experience, then, we are not presented with bare sensory giv-
ens, but with complex objects that have been constructed in a 
process that moves from the "'mimetic' to the 'analogical' up 
to the 'purely -symbolical"' 23. If we can show how the symbol -
ic meaning of perceptual exper ience has been constructed from 
basis phenomena, then we can communicate how the cultural 
objects we have constructed were built, and therefore the origin 
of our comprehension of them24. 
Steinthal' s analysis of logic as tracing the processes of thought 
and knowledge provides the basis for a 'logical' evaluation of 
expression, communication, understanding, and explanation in 
the cultural sciences. However, as shown above, Cassirer pro-
vides a very similar analysis of symbolic forms in his readings of 
Uexkiill in the life sciences, and of Goldstein in psychology. For 
Steinthal and Cassirer, formal analysis does not merely divide a 
field of study into distinct conceptual categories and functional 
relationships between them. Rather, it traces and emerges from 
processes in nature, and from the processes of comprehending, 
expressing, and explaining in human mental life. 
The basis of the "unity" of the human, cultural, and natu -
ral sciences in Cassirer is thus not any functional or relational 
reduction of thing-concepts to observables, for instance (as in 
22 NCW 25 [CASSIRE.R 1999, 661-662, translation amended]. 
2> NCW 25 [CASSIRE.R 1999, 661]. 
24 Cassirer's debt to psychological accoun ts like Goldstein 's must be weighed 
against well -known arguments by the Marburg School against "psychologism ". For Na-
torp's anti-psycbologism see EDGAR 2015. 
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rival reductionist accounts from early philosophy of science). 
Rather, Cassirer bases his analysis on the fact that social and ex-
pressive communication is a natural process, just as population 
dynamics or combustion are natural processes. In both cases, 
the basis for our understanding of those processes is the con-
struction of a language that expresses the internal logic of the 
process and phenomena, and that allows for objective commu-
nication of the symbolic forms embodied in them. 
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